ICBC Law

Reasons for judgement were released today dealing with the issue of whether a defendant ordered to pay a plaintiff money for future wage loss as a result of a BC motor vehicle accident can deduct from such an award disability benefits the Plaintiff will receive from the Canada Pension Plan (CPP).

The Plaintiff was injured in a 2005 motor vehicle collision.  Liability was not seriously contested and the Defendant was found 100% at fault at trial.  The Plaintiff suffered serious injuries including a

1. Fractured sternum; and

2. Head injury with probable significant cerebral concussion; and

3. Contused lower thoracic spine and upper lumbar spine; and

4. Multiple rib contusions.

The most contested injury was whether the Plaintiff suffered from on-going problems as a result of a brain injury allegedly sustained in the collision.  The court found for the Plaintiff noting that 

[71]            On balance I conclude that I accept the expert evidence to the effect that it is more likely than not that there are persisting, but very mild, sequelae from the mild traumatic brain injury affecting cognition.  The effects on Mr. Kean’s cognition are so subtle as to be virtually indistinguishable from the concurrent effects from the other operating causes, namely pain, pain medication, and depressed mood. 

The Court assessed damages as follows:

ICBC argued that money the plaintiff has/will receive from CPP should be deducted from his awards for past wage loss and future wage loss awards.  The court dismissed this argument concluding that  ”the law in this jurisdiction is settled to the effect that CPP disability benefits fall within the insurance exception to the rule against double recovery and should not be deducted from tort awards for past or future wage loss”

The key discussion took place at paragraphs 102 - 111 which I reproduce below:

[102]        Counsel for the defendant and the third party argued that CPP disability benefits received by Mr. Kean should be deducted from his award for past wage loss, and the present value of future CPP disability benefits should be deducted from his future income award.  The thrust of their argument is that this is necessary to prevent double recovery.  The defendant argues that CPP disability benefits are a form of mandatory social insurance that workers cannot negotiate out of, and the scheme is a form of income replacement.

[103]        The defendant’s argument is essentially the same argument that these same counsel made unsuccessfully in the case of Maillet v. Rosenau 2006 BCSC 10.  In Maillet, the plaintiff had received social assistance payments which were deducted from the past wage loss, but Powers J. did not accede to the defendant’s argument that future CPP disability benefits should be deducted from the award for losses of future earnings.  As here, the defendants relied on the case of M.B v. British Columbia, 2003 SCC 53, suggesting that the rationale applied in that case to conclude that social assistance payments were deductible from a future wage loss award, was equally applicable to CPP disability benefits and that the decision represented a change in the law.

[104]        In Maillet, Powers J. followed a line of authority which had held that the CPP disability pension scheme was essentially an insurance scheme and covered by the insurance exception to the rule against double recovery.  This line of authority includes Canadian Pacific v. Gill,[1973] S.C.R. 654, Hayre v. Walz (1992), 67 B.C.L.R. (2d) 296 (BCCA) and Cugliari v. White, (1998) 159 D.L.R. 4^th 254 (Ont.C.A.).

[105]        Like Powers J, I do not see the reasoning in M.B. as effecting a change in the law as it applies to CPP disability payments.  The analysis undertaken in that case was outlined in ¶24 of the decision:

The first question is whether social assistance is a form of income replacement.  If it is not, no duplication arises.  If it is, the further question arises of whether social assistance can be excluded from the non-duplication rule under an existing or new exception.

[106]        The court determined that social assistance was a form of income replacement and then stated in ¶28:

It follows that the only way in which they can be non-deductible at common law is if they fit within the charitable benefits exception, or if this court carves out a new exception. Otherwise, retention of them would amount to double recovery.

[107]        After holding that social assistance payments did not fit the charitable benefits exception (because the rationale for that exception did not concern the purpose of charitable donations, but its effect on the owners and the difficulties of valuation), the court discussed whether it should carve out a new policy- based exception.  The court decided that it should not do so.  Clearly there was no viable argument that the insurance exception might be applicable to social assistance and that was not considered.

[108]        The defendant wishes to characterize the CPP disability payments as a form of social security because it is a legislative creature and contributions are mandatory. But, unlike social assistance, it is funded by contributions and only those who have contributed can benefit.  There is an overlap of recovery, but that is inherent in the insurance exception to the rule against double recovery.  The other side of the coin is that to deduct the CPP benefits from a tort award is to force the injured contributor to share the benefits of his contributions, (which represent deductions from his former earnings), with the tortfeasor.

[109]        The defendant’s book of authorities included, in fairness, the case of Sulz v. Minister of Public Safety and Solicitor General 2006 BCCA 582, which was decided shortly after theMaillet decision.  In Sulz, the British Columbia Court of Appeal quotes from Mr, Justice Iacobucci in Sarvanis v. Canada 2002 SCC 28 at ¶33:

….it has already been held by this court that CPP disability payments are not to be considered indemnity payments, and therefore that they are not to be deducted from tort damages compensating injuries that actually caused or contributed to the relevant disability.  See Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. Gill; Cugliari, supra.  This rule is passed on the contractual or contradictory nature of the CPP.  Only contributors are eligible, at the outset received benefits, provided that they then meet the requisite further conditions.

[110]        The issue in Sulz was the deduction of superannuation pension from a tort award.  The British Columbia Court of Appeal, in a decision written by Madam Justice Levine, (who was the trial judge in M.B. whose deduction of social assistance payments was upheld by the Supreme Court of Canada) said, at ¶65:

The superannuation pension received by the respondent is of the same character as CPP disability benefits and other pension payments, which have consistently held to be non-deductible from tort damages.

[111]        I conclude, as did the court in Maillet, that the law in this jurisdiction is settled to the effect that CPP disability benefits fall within the insurance exception to the rule against double recovery and should not be deducted from tort awards for past or future wage loss.

NOTE - the reasoning of this case may not apply to all ICBC claims.  For example in ICBC UMP Claims where ICBC is entitled to certain statutory deductions from the damages they need to pay to an insured.

If you have been injured in a BC motor vehicle accident and suffered a wage loss you may have had ICBC tell you that they can only pay you your ‘net wage loss’ in your tort claim.

I have often often seen ICBC calculate a person’s gross wage loss and deduct 25% to account for income taxes prior to paying the past wage loss.  Is this proper?  The answer is sometimes.  It depends on the amnount of your past wage loss award.

Great reasons for judgement were released today by Madam Justice Boyd of the BC Supreme Court.  In this case the court awarded $8,750.36 for past wage loss.  ICBC then tried to deduct income taxes on this amount prior to paying it.  Madame Justice Boyd summarized the applicable law very well and concluded that the leading BC Supreme Court dealing with this issue(Hudniuk v. Warkentin) applies, and using its principles

‘the Plaintiff’s net income loss should be calculated by deducting the necessary income tax from the agreed gross income loss of $8,750.36.  Further, as Hudniuk requires, for the purposes of tax calculations, this formula assumes that this amount is the only income earned by the Plaintiff in 2008.  Since the first day of trial was May 12, 2008, the tax rates in effect of the previous calendar year, as or December 31, 2007, are applicable‘

The court then noted that at the time personal income under $9,027 was exempt from taxation meaning the Plaintiff was entitled to the whole amount of past wage loss.

So, according to this judgement, if the past income loss you are entitled to in a BC ICBC tort claim is less than the personal income amount that is exempt from taxation you are entitled to the whole of your past wage loss.

I have heard through the grape-vine that the BC Court of Appeal will soon further clarify this area of the law, but until that time today’s case sets a great precedent for Plaintiff’s with less than $9,000 in past wage loss.

 

Following a 2 day trial using the Fast Track Rule  (Rule 66), reasons for judgement were released today compensating a Plaintiff as a result of a 2005 BC car accident.

The Plaintiff was injured as a passenger.  The offending motorist admitted fault and the trial focused on damages (lawful compensation) only.

The Plaintiff had a range of complaints following the accident including pain in her neck, right shoulder and low back, and a significant increase in the frequency of her pre-existing migraine headaches.

In assessing a fair award for pain and suffering the court made the following finding:

[24] I accept the plaintiff’s evidence that she was injured in the August 9, 2005 motor vehicle accident.  In this regard, I note that while the physicians who examined the plaintiff also accepted the plaintiff’s assertions, the fact that they did so does not assist the court in making that finding.  Their observations thereafter are of considerable assistance in assessing the possible course of the plaintiff’s recovery, however.  It does appear, taking account of what is before me, that the plaintiff recovered functionally very quickly although she may suffer some minor aches and pains that will occasionally interfere with her activities.

[25] The plaintiff has suffered some moderate interference with her life due to pain and suffering.  The cases advanced as comparables by the parties are of some assistance in locating this case on an appropriate scale.  I assess her damages for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life at $25,000.

The Plaintiff also led evidence that she was able to take advantage of fewer overtime opportunities as a result of her injuries.  For this loss the court awarded $20,000.

The court found that the injuries should continue to improve but may linger for a while longer.  In addressing loss of earning capacity the court awarded $15,000 making the following findings:

She is capable of doing her work and of working considerable overtime.  On the basis of the medical evidence there is good reason to expect that she will fully recover in the next few years, with a modest chance of some limited impairment further into the future.  I think some allowance must be made for the possibility that the plaintiff may occasionally suffer losses into the future that are related to the injuries she has suffered.  I think the evidence suggests that these losses will be incurred, for the most part, in the next few years.  I fix the sum of $15,000 for loss of future earning capacity.

Reasons for judgement were released today compensating a Plaintiff for injuries and losses sustained in a 2004 car accident.

The Plaintiff was driving her daughter to pre-school when her vehicle was rear-ended. The impact was ‘sudden and relatively severe‘ and caused enough damage to render the Plaintiff’s vehicle a write-off.

The court heard from a variety of medical ‘expert witnesses’ and placed the most weight on the Plaintiff’s GP. The court found that the Plaintiff ‘now has chronic pain with her soft tissue injuries and that pain and discomfort, in varying levels depending on activity level, will continue indefenately.’ The court also found that the Plaintiff suffers from ‘anxiety associated witht he accident’ and that ‘(she) is at risk of premature arthritis in her cervical spine and left shoulder‘.

In awarding $50,000 for the Plaintiff’s non-pecuniary loss (pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life) the court noted that:

[14] The injuries have affected the plaintiff’s family relationships. She is not able to participate in normal physical family and recreational activities to the same extent as before the accident. She cannot perform housework or garden to the same extent. She presents as a perfectionist and is clearly bothered by these restrictions on activities that she enjoys and takes pride in.

[15] (The Plaintiff) is also anxious and, perhaps, somewhat depressed; her relationship with her husband has been adversely affected, and she is naturally concerned and upset that her children now turn more naturally to their father for physical support and comfort. In addition to the ongoing pain and discomfort that restricts general activities, these factors also affect enjoyment of life. I take them into account in determining a fit award for non-pecuniary loss.

The most interesting part of this judgement for me was the court’s discussion of loss of earning capacity. Here the court found that the Plaintiff does have permanent injuries but that these will have ‘slight, if any, actual impact on her future earnings‘.

What interested me was the courts comments trying to reconcile to seemingly opposed lines of authority from the BC Court of Appeal addressing loss of future earnings. When one asks for an award for ‘loss of future income’ or ‘loss of earning capacity’ one has to prove this loss. There are various ways of doing this at trial.

Here the Plaintiff advanced a claim of loss of earning capacity using the ‘capital asset approach‘ as set out by our Court of Appeal in Pallos v. ICBC. The Defence lawyer argued that a subsequent case (Steward v. Berezan) overruled the law as set out in Pallos.

After listening to this debate the court noted that:

44] With respect, it is not clear, as I understand Steward, how one gets to the capital asset approach without first proving a substantial possibility of future income loss in relation to the plaintiff’s position at the time of trial. I cannot reconcile that approach with the factors first listed in Brown, later summarized in Palmer, and finally approved in Pallos in the passages set out earlier in my reasons.

[45] It would be helpful if the Court of Appeal has an opportunity to address these issues fully. I observe that the Court of Appeal since held in one decision that Steward turned on its facts and did not create any new principle of law. The court also affirmed Parypa in the same decision. See Djukic v. Hahn, 2007 BCCA 203, at paras. 14 and 15.

Here the court held that “there is no reference in Steward to Pallos. Steward, in my view, does not over rule Pallos‘.

Mr. Justice Macaulay went on to reconcile the apparent conflict between these cases by concluding that Steward should be limited to its own ‘narrow factual circumstances‘ and awarding the Plaintiff damages based on the less stingent ‘capital asset approach‘.

Do you have questions about this case or about an ICBC injury claim involving future wage loss? If so please click here to arrange your free consultation with Victoria ICBC Claims Lawyer Erik Magraken (Services provided for ICBC injury claims throughout BC!)

In a judgement released today a total of $81,694 was awarded in compensation as a result of a 2004 ‘chain rear end’ accident in BC.

The accident involved mutliple vehicles and the force of the crash was enough to write off the Plaintiff’s car. Fault was admitted by ICBC leaving only quantum of damages at issue.

As a result of crash the court found that the Plaintiff suffered from a fracture at T12 and a disc injury to T11 / T12 and perhaps T9 / T10 (basically fractures to the mid back) and that the Plaintiff ‘has gone on to develop a chronic pain syndrome with discomfort, sleep disturbance and depression.

The court went on to award $60,000 for pain and suffering, $20,000 for Loss of Earning Capacity and just over $1,000 in special damages (out of pocket expenses as a result of the accident.)

This case is worth reading for the judge’s discussion of credibility. When people complain of ‘chronic pain’ in an ICBC claim their credibility is always at issue. The reason is obvious, pain cannot be measured objectively. People can only describe their pain and a judge or jury can believe this descrpiton or reject it. In this case the judge had problems with the Plaintiff’s credibility but accepted that her chronic pain syndrome was legitimate.

More interesting is the judge’s comments on the credibility of the expert witnesses that testified. In this case ICBC, on behalf of the Defendant, hired an orthopaedic surgeon to examine the Plaintiff. He testified, in essence, that the Plaintiff had no serious injuries or ongoing problems. The court rejected this doctor’s evidence finding that ‘it was obvious to me that he had not spent as much time, nor was he as objective in his assessment of the Plaintiff (as her own physicians were). (ICBC’s doctor) impressed upon me that he was more of an advocate for ICBC than an objective expert, and I therefoe attach little wieght to his evidence.

This case is also worth reviewing for the judge’s great summary of the law relating to future wage loss at paragraphs 34 and 35.

Do you have questions about this case or an ICBC chronic pain syndrome claim that wish to discuss with a BC personal injury lawyer? If so click hereto arrange your free consultation with Victoria ICBC injury claims lawyer Erik Magraken (with associated offices in Victoria, Nanaimo, Kelowna, Port Hardy, Kamloops, Duncan, Courtenay, Qualicum Beach, Port McNeil, Tofino, Vernon, Dawson Creek, Revelstoke, Ucluelet, Salmon Arm, Castlegar, Sicamous and Nakusp)

Reasons for judgement were released today awarding a Plaintiff just over $100,000 in compensation for injuries and losses arising from a 2006 BC car accident.

This was primarily a low-back soft tissue injury case. The Plaintiff did have other injuries but these largely resolved.

Fault was admitted for the accident, as such, the trial focussed exclusively on quantum (value of the injuries).

In reading the reasons for judgement Mr. Justice Metzger was obviously impressed with the Plaintiff. ICBC’s defence (assuming of course that the defendants were insured by ICBC) was largely rejected.

The court summarized the plaintiff’s injuries and course of recovery as follows:

[14] I am satisfied that within seven to ten months of the accident, the plaintiff recovered from any significant discomfort or effect of injuries to his shoulder, wrist, right foot and right side. Although Mr. Raper’s low back pain does not prevent him from working, or from mountain scrambling, I am satisfied that his physical ability in these pursuits has been compromised. His ability to perform his work to his previous standards and to enjoy his sports activities has been decreased.

After naming some precedents dealing with low back injuries the court went on to award $35,000 for non-pecuniary damages (pain and suffering).

This case is worth reading for the court’s discussion of future wage loss or loss of future earning capacity. In this case the Plaintiff returned to work shortly after the accident and continued to work through to trial. Despite this the court found that he was entitled to an award for loss of future earning capacity because he could no longer do general carpentry work (something that he has done in the past during slow cycles of employment) and that he lost the opportunity tow obtain a management position in his current line of work. In these circumstnaces the court awarded $55,000 for loss of earning capacity.

This case, and many like it, goes to show that simply because a person recovered from injuries to the point that they are able to return to work does not preclude an award for future wage loss. There are many factors to consider when valuing a future wage loss in an ICBC claim. In this case Mr. Justice Metzger did a good job summarizing the law and repeated one of the quotes that all ICBC claims lawyers should be aware of, namely that:

Because it is impairment that is being redressed, even a plaintiff who is apparently going to be able to earn as much as he could have earned if not injured or who, with retraining, on the balance of probabilities will be able to do so, is entitled to some compensation for the impairment. He is entitled to it because for the rest of his life some occupations will be closed to him and it is impossible to say that over his working life the impairment will not harm his income earning ability.

Do you have questions about this case or or an ICBC future wage loss claim that wish to discuss with a BC personal injury lawyer? If so click hereto arrange your free consultation with Victoria ICBC injury claims lawyer Erik Magraken (with associated offices in Victoria, Nanaimo, Kelowna, Port Hardy, Kamloops, Duncan, Courtenay, Qualicum Beach, Port McNeil, Tofino, Vernon, Dawson Creek, Revelstoke, Ucluelet, Salmon Arm, Castlegar, Sicamous and Nakusp)

In reasons for judgement released today Madam Justice Dillon of the BC Supreme Court awarded an injured Plaintiff just over $200,000 in damages as a result of a ‘hit and run’ accident.

The Plaintiff was 56 at the time of the BC car crash. He was on his way to work when he was rear-ended. The crash was significant enough to push the Plaintiff’s car the length of a city block prior to coming to a stop. The Defendant ‘took off around a corner” after the collision.

The Plaintiff is an apparently stoic man who returned to work despite being injured in this crash. He continued to work for several days ‘before (his) neck and back pain, headaches and dizziness steadily increased to the point that (he) was unable to perfrom the heavy work of a millwright.’

The Plaintiff was off work for almost 6 months prior to returning to work full time. Once returning he struggled and needed assistance from his work partners. He also struggled in taking advantage of over-time opportunities.

As in many ICBC injury claims that go to trial, the court heard from various doctors including an orthopaedic surgeon, a physiatrist, a neurologist and the Plaintiff’s GP. Again, as is common in ICBC injury claims, the doctors testifying had varying takes on the nature and severity of the Plaintiff’s injuries and their connection to the car accident.

No issue was taken a trial as to who was at fault for this rear-end accident. The trial focused on quantum of damages (value of the injuries). The theory advanced by ICBC’s expert was that, while the Plaintiff was injured, the Plaintiff ‘probably would have had these problems regardless of the accident because of his underlying degeneration of the cervical and lumbar spine‘.

The court heard evidence from the Plaintiff’s doctors that he had various injuries that would likely impact him well into the future.

The court’s key finding as to the extent of injury can be found at paragraph 28 where Madam Justice Dillon noted that:

[28] There is no medical opinion that the plaintiff would have suffered from chronic neck or back pain, to the extent and severity that he has incurred, but for the accident. Gold has developed severe and disabling chronic neck and back pain, which significantly limits movement. He continues to have headaches. His condition plateaued within two years after the injury and has not improved despite reasonable effort on his part. This has had a significant effect on his ability to work overtime to the extent that he did before the accident and requires cooperation with his work partners to fulfill the mandate of his job without formal accommodation being made. He has suffered a loss of lifestyle and recreational activity.

The court awarded $80,000 for ‘general damages’ (pain and suffering).

The court also made an award for past wage loss, past loss of overtime opportunities and loss of future earnings.

This case raised some common issues which often arise in ICBC claims. Particularly the amount of past loss income when a Plaintiff returns to work but is not able to work as many overtime shifts. I recommend this case for anyone involved in an ICBC injury claim who has missed overtime work as a result of injuries. This case gives an example of how this issue can be dealt with at trial. The personal injury lawyer representing the Plaintiff capably called evidence addressing wage loss and overtime and in the end the court addressed this loss fairly.

In awarding money for loss of future wages, the court noted that “there is more than a substantial possibility that the plaintiff will be unable to work overtime at his historical pre-accident rate into the future.’ and also that, given the Plaintiff’s age and injuries, that he would have ‘a difficult time finding work if his (current) job ended‘, As a result of this the court awarded $70,000 for loss of future earnings / loss of earning capacity.

Lastly, the ICBC lawyers argued that “damages should be reduced by 25% because the plaintiff failed to start an exercise programme as recommended by his general practitioner, his physiotherapist, and the rehabilitation medicine specialist“

This argument is known in law as ‘failure to mitigate’. If a person injured in an ICBC claim does not take reasonable steps to recover from their injuries the value of compensation can be reduced.

The court summarized the law of ‘failure to mitigate’ as follows:

[44] To succeed in this submission, the third party must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that the plaintiff failed to undertake the recommended treatment; that by following that recommended treatment he could have overcome or could in the future overcome the problems; and that his refusal to take that treatment was unreasonable (Janiak v. Ippolito, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 146, 16 D.L.R. (4th) 1; Maslen v. Rubenstein, [1994] 1 W.W.R. 53 at 57-58, 83 B.C.L.R. (2d) 131 (C.A.); Fox v. Danis, 2005 BCSC 102 at para. 37). The remedial programme must be likely to achieve resolution of the problem or at least have a positive effect on the plaintiff’s injury arising from the accident (Hepner v. Gill, [1999] B.C.J. No. 1755 at paras. 5 and 7 (S.C.) (QL); Briglio v. Faulkner and Reichel, 1999 BCCA 361, 69 B.C.L.R. (3d) 122 at para. 44; Wong v. Stolarchuk, [1997] B.C.J. No. 2837 at para. 48 (S.C.) (QL)). The reasonableness of a refusal to undertake a recommended programme depends upon the risk that such a programme would impose, the gravity of the consequence of refusing to participate, and the potential benefits to be derived from it (Janiak v. Ippolito, supra).

The court rejected ICBC’s failure to mitigate arguments.

This case illustrates just how important credibility is in ICBC injury claims. The court clearly liked the Plaintiff and he made a good impression on the judge. His stoic attitude certainly helped. Contrary to what some believe, having a tough attitude in the face of injuries does not hurt the value of an ICBC case, as this case illustrates, this postitive attribute can in fact add to the credibilty of an injured person and help result in a good trial result.

Do you have questions about this case or an ICBC case involving future wage loss or loss of overtime opportunities that you wish to discuss with a BC personal injury lawyer? If so click here to arrange your free consultation with Victoria ICBC injury claims lawyer Erik Magraken (with associated offices in Victoria, Nanaimo, Kelowna, Port Hardy, Kamloops, Duncan, Courtenay, Qualicum Beach, Port McNeil, Tofino, Vernon, Dawson Creek, Revelstoke, Ucluelet, Salmon Arm, Castlegar, Sicamous and Nakusp)

In reasons for judgement released today, Mr. Justice Wilson awarded a total of $180,995.90 plus Court Costs in compensation to a young man who was injured as a passenger in a 2004 motor vehicle collision in Ucluelet, BC.

The Plaintiff was a back seat passenger. His vehicle left the road and hit a tree.

The court made its findings of fact addressing injuries at Paragraph 26 of the judgement where the court held that:

[26] In the result, then, I conclude that Mr. Thorp sustained a minor injury to his wrist which had cleared up within two weeks. I also conclude that he sustained a posterolateral dislocation of the right elbow. Although Mr. Thorp did well in his recovery in the initial period, he continues to have some restriction on range of motion and ongoing discomfort, particularly in performing physical activities. Although the pain may be due to the calcification in the elbow which might go away over time, he can expect to have that for a considerable period of time. I accept the opinion of Mr. Vanderboer that Mr. Thorp does have pain-related limitations in the strength of his right arm, and his endurance and tolerance for activity. I thus accept Mr. Vanderboer’s opinion that he is not physically capable of manual labour-type occupations, and the opinion of Dr. Gutmanis that if he chose to pursue more physical work, he would have greater likelihood of the development of post traumatic arthritis. I also accept Mr. Thorp’s evidence that, as a result of the ongoing pain, he has restricted many of his previous physical activities.

The court did a great job reviewing applicable case law addressing loss of future earning capacity at paragraphs 53-68 of the reasons for judgement.  This was necessary because the Plaintiff was a young man with a potentially permanent elbow injury.  The effects of this closed the door to certain employmnet opportunities thus giving rise to a claim for future wage loss.  After applying the facts to the law Mr. Justice Wilson awarded a total of $50,000 for Loss of Future Earning Capacity.

Damages of $50,000 were awarded for Pain and Suffering and a further $80,000 was awarded for past wage loss.

This is one of the few recent BC court cases addressing fair compensation for non-pecuniary loss (pain and suffering) for a dislocated elbow.  The difficulty the lawyers had finding similar elbow injury cases to help guide the court is acknowledged at paragraph 29 of the judgement.  If you are engaged in settlement negotiations with ICBC for pain and suffering for an elbow injury this case is worth a quick read.

Do you have questions you would like answerd by an ICBC Claims Lawyer regarding an elbow injury? Click here to contact Erik Magraken for a free consultation to discuss your claim.

In a judgement released today by Madam Justice Humphries, a total of $58,000 was awarded to a 37 year old plaintiff as a result of a 2004 motor vehicle accident in Vancouver, BC.

The Plaintiff suffered soft tissue injuries in her neck, shoulder and low back. The accident also caused depression which was, according to the court, at least as debilitating as the physical injuries. The court found that the physical and psychological injuries were inter-connected.

The Plaintiff did suffer from pre-existing injuries in all of the above areas as a result of a 1996 motor vehicle accident. Evidence was presented that she was largely recovered from her pre-existing soft tissue injuries and depression by the time of the 2004 accident.

The court summarized her injuries as follows:

“From all the medical reports and from her own evidence, (the Plaintiff) appears to have recovered from the physical effects of this accident by late 2005 or early 2006 in the sense that she had ceased experiencing daily and ongoing pain. However, she continues to have and can expect to have bouts of pain depending on her activities. This is somewhat similar to the same state she was in prior to the accident, when she could work long hours, attending physiotherapy once in awhile if she was experiencing discomfort caused by her job. However, I accept that the effects of over-exertion and work-related activities since the second accident are more limiting than they were just prior to it “

In the end the court awarded $45,000 for pain and suffering (non-pecuniary damages), $3,000 for past wage loss and $10,000 for loss of earning capacity.

If you have an ICBC claim and have suffered from pre-existing injuries that were re-injured or aggravated by a subsequent car accident this case is worth reading to see some of the factors courts consider in these circumstances.

Also of interest is the courts reasoning in awarding some money for past wage loss despite the “flimsy” evidence that was advanced in support of an income loss claim. The Plaintiff was a self-employed photographer and there was no hard evidence of lost income. The court, at paragraph 40, held as follows:

It is only common sense that a self-employed person whose work depends on dealing with the public, persuading people to hire her, and being able to carry heavy cameras and position herself quickly in order to take pictures must be able to rely on physical agility and a pleasant personality in order to work to her full capacity. I accept that (the Plaintiff) was putting in many hours building her contacts and working on various facets of her business just prior to the accident, and due to her temporary physical limitations and some periods of depression, she was able to work less after the accident for a period of time. However, the amount of the loss is not amenable to a calculation, and many of the hours she put in were not necessarily hours for which she would be able to bill a client. As well, her earnings in the years prior to the accident were very low; in fact, she made more in 2004 than she did in 2002 and 2003. I assess an amount of $3,000 for past wage loss based on the plaintiff’s evidence of the restrictions she faced in carrying on with her existing business and the delay in her plans to expand her baby/pet photography.

If you are having difficulty agreeing to settlement of an ICBC claim because of pre-existing injuries or because of a disputed claim for past-loss of income from a self-employed business this case is worth a read to see how our courts sometimes deal with these issues.

Do you have any questions about this case? If so feel free to contact the author.

In a case that can be characterized as “the straw the broke the camel’s back”, a Plaintiff was awarded over $90,000 soft-tissue injuries and a L5-S1 disc herniation which were caused (at least in part) as a result of a 2003 car accident.

The Plaintiff was a 47 year old with a long history of back injuries. She had pre-exsting low back pain, neck pain and a bilateral facet-joint arthropathy.

She was involved in a fairly serious car accident in 2003. Her vehicle sustained damage which took close to $5,000 to repair.

At trial both a neurosurgeon and an physiatrist testified on behalf of the Plaintiff. The neurosurgeon’s opinion was that “(the Plaintiff’s) disk herniation was caused by small tears to the annular fibres surrounding the disc which eventually ruptured due to the ongoing stresses from day to day living” and that “(since the car accident) was the last major trauma before (the Plaintiff) experienced the disc herniation, it was a significant contributor to the problem.” The Plaintiff’s physiatrist largely shared this opinion.

ICBC lawyers defending claims often retain orthopaedic surgeons who disagree with treating physicians. This common insurance defence step was followed in this case as the defence lawyers retained an orthopaedic surgeon who testified there was “no objective evidence of ongoing injury to explain the Plaintiff’s ongoing pain“.

The Defence also showed video surveillance of the Plaintiff doing various activities including getting in and out of her car on many occasions with minimal difficulty. I have previously blogged about surveillance evidence and ICBC claims and don’t intend to re-visit this subject at length but will point out that this is a common tactic ICBC lawyers take when defending injury claims and Justice Fenton, at paragraph 10 and 11 of the judgement canvasses the position that many ICBC lawyers take at trial when they have surveillance evidence which shows a Plaintiff potentially overstating injuries.

After hearing all the medical evidence the court accepted the opinions of the Plaintiff’s physiatrist and neurologist and stated that “(the Plaintiff’s) earlier accidents, along with degenerative changes to her spine, made her more vulnerable to lower back injury. Accordingly, while I cannot find the defendant’s negligence was the only cause of the Plaintiff’s problems after February 13, 2003, on a balance of probabilities, I find that the defendant’s negligence materially contributed to the occurrence of those injuries”

The court assessed the Plaintiff’s damages as follows:

1. Pain and Suffering: $65,000

2. Special Damages (out of pocket expenses): $3,118

3. Past Wage Loss: $88,000

4. Cost of Future Care: $5,000

Justice Fenlon then reduced the total award by 40% to account for the risk that the Plaintiff’s pre-existing condition in her spine and her psychological fragility would have detrimentally affected her in the future, regardless of the car accident.

Justice Fenlon did a great job in canvassing the applicable law in determining whether the car accident caused the Plaintiff injury. This case is worth reading to get insight into the factors courts consider when addressing pre-existing injuries that were aggravated by a car accident, and further to see the “thin-skull” legal principle in action which is well canvassed at paragraphs 42-44 of the judgement.